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Abstract This article reviews climate change within the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030
(SFDRR), analyzing how climate change is mentioned in
the framework’s text and the potential implications for
dealing with climate change within the context of disaster
risk reduction. Three main categories are examined. First,
climate change affecting disaster risk and disasters,
demonstrating too much emphasis on the single hazard
driver and diminisher of climate change. Second, cross-
sectoral approaches, for which the SFDRR treads carefully,
thereby unfortunately entrenching artificial differences and
divisions, although appropriately offering plenty of support
to other sectors from disaster risk reduction. Third,
implementation, for which climate change plays a suitable
role without being overbearing, but for which other hazard
influencers should have been treated similarly. Overall, the
mentions of climate change within the SFDRR put too
much emphasis on the hazard part of disaster risk. Instead,
within the context of the three global sustainable devel-
opment processes that seek agreements in 2015, climate
change could have been used to further support an all-
vulnerabilities and all-resiliences approach. That could be
achieved by placing climate change adaptation as one
subset within disaster risk reduction and climate change
mitigation as one subset within sustainable development.
Keywords Climate change  Climate change
adaptation  Climate change mitigation  Climate
variability  Disaster mitigation  Disaster risk reduction
1 Introduction
In 2015, three separate global sustainable development
processes aimed for long-term agreements. First, in March
in Sendai, Japan, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction 2015–2030 (SFDRR) (UNISDR 2015) laid out a
voluntary pathway for the next 15 years of disaster risk
reduction, following on from the 10 years of the Hyogo
Framework for Action 2005–2015 (HFA) (UNISDR 2005).
Second, in September in New York, the United States, the
United Nations will meet to ratify the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (not yet public), also voluntary and the
successor to the Millennium Development Goals (UN
2000), which ran from 2000 to 2015. Third, in Paris,
France in December, the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) will pursue a
legally binding treaty for dealing with climate change. The
focus is on climate change mitigation efforts, which means
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and increasing sinks.
Any agreement could potentially include many elements
for climate change adaptation, the reduction of the expec-
ted adverse impacts of climate change and the application
of possible benefits.
The separation of these three processes has historical
and political reasons, but to achieve the goals of each they
ought to be joined (Kelman et al. 2015). Nonetheless, they
will not come together fully, although they are making
efforts to connect better and to follow each other closely,
even if that means clearly demarcating territory for each
one. For example, in the draft leading up to the Sustainable
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Development Goals (UN 2014), Goal 13 ‘‘Take urgent
action to combat climate change and its impacts’’ has an
asterisk that states ‘‘Acknowledging that the UNFCCC is
the primary international, intergovernmental forum for
negotiating the global response to climate change.’’ Those
words explicitly separate the UN’s legal process to address
climate change from the UN’s voluntary process to address
sustainable development.
Similarly, there is no doubt that climate change affects
aspects of disasters and of disaster risk reduction, even
though some parties promoting climate change have sep-
arated climate change from disaster risk reduction. Climate
change work has recently made efforts to impose climate
change views on disaster risk reduction (IPCC 2012), often
without learning many disaster-related lessons. Other lit-
erature proposes different ways forward, but often seeks to
continue the partition between climate change and disaster-
related topics without questioning why they are assumed to
be separate or without fully exploring the difficulties which
could ensue due to the separation (Thomalla et al. 2006;
Solecki et al. 2011).
There is no dispute that some involved with climate
change have kept it separate from wider processes, for
research, policy, and practice. Consequently, it would be
difficult realistically to bring climate change, disaster risk
reduction, and sustainable development under one umbrella
due to academic territorialism and lock-into the separate
global processes. When analyses are completed to deter-
mine whether they should actually be separate, possible
solutions emerge. Kelman and Gaillard (2010) and Kelman
et al. (2015) start from basic definitions, showing that cli-
mate change and its associated processes are fully
embraced by disaster-related efforts, so a proposed joining
of the two would be to place climate change within disaster
work. That has two pillars.
First, climate change is one hazard driver amongst
many; it is one factor influencing certain hazards with the
potential to contribute to disasters where vulnerability and
exposure exist. Second, climate change adaptation is a
subset of disaster risk reduction. Empirical studies such as
in Shaw et al. (2010a, b) and Mercer et al. (2014)
demonstrate how this theoretical approach would be
achieved in practice. In recognizing the similarities
alongside the reality that both fields have strong vested
interests in remaining separate, Glantz (2015) suggests
seeking specific programmes and projects which would
‘‘blend’’ climate change and disaster activities, in order to
bring both on board.
A third aspect can be described, but for climate change
mitigation, placing climate change mitigation within sus-
tainable development since climate change mitigation is
the same as pollution prevention, but it focuses on green-
house gases as specific pollutants. Air pollution prevention
was being regulated and engineered long before climate
change became a global concern (Ross 1972). Reducing
greenhouse gas sources employs similar principles and
practices, including the reduction of consumption at the
individual level that has long been advocated (van Sickle
1971). Increasing greenhouse gas sinks relates to general
environmental management actions such as land use
practices (Starr 1961) and ecosystem conservation (Usher
1973), which, again, are long-standing and well-known
activities. No claim is made that knowledge and techniques
stagnated decades ago nor that climate change mitigation
fails to bring new, innovative ideas. The principles and
ethos, however, remain the same. Climate change mitiga-
tion introduces different pollutants to reduce, preferably to
prevent their excessive production, becoming an important
element of ongoing pollution prevention principles and
practices.
Despite the strong impetus to retain and entrench the
artificial separation amongst the three global processes
mentioned at the outset, thereby retaining the separation for
the next 15-and-more years, the SFDRR nonetheless
acknowledges and emphasizes the importance of climate
change and sustainable development for disaster risk
reduction and vice versa. The challenge is knowing whe-
ther the included acknowledgement, emphasis, and cross-
overs suffice to avoid problems, or whether more harm than
good will be done by having three separate agreements—
voluntary ones for disaster risk reduction and sustainable
development and aiming for a legal one for climate change.
To contribute to such analyses, this article reviews cli-
mate change within the SFDRR, analyzing how climate
change is mentioned in the framework’s text and the
potential implications for dealing with climate change
within the context of disaster risk reduction. The next
section details how climate change does and does not
influence disaster risk. Then in due course, presents and
critiques the mentions of climate change in the SFDRR,
followed by discussion on how climate change is and is not
represented and included. The conclusions summarize the
implications for the three 2015 processes.
2 Climate Change Influencing Disaster Risk
Disaster risk, by definition, is a combination of hazard and
vulnerability, with different approaches taken to combine
the two parameters depending on the theory adopted or the
practice being pursued (Lewis 1999; Wisner et al. 2004,
2012; UNISDR 2009). To examine how climate change
does and does not influence disaster risk, both hazard and
vulnerability need to be considered. As an influence upon
hazards, the Earth’s climate has always changed through-
out humanity’s and the planet’s history, including long-
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term trends, shifts in the state and baseline, variabilities,
and cycles.
Contemporary climate change has two principal defini-
tions. The main scientific body responsible for assessing
and synthesizing climate change science for governmental
approval is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC). The first IPCC assessment was published
in 1990 with the latest one, the fifth assessment, published
in 2013–2014. The IPCC regulations state that all reports
are reviewed and approved by member state governments.
The IPCC’s (2014, p. 5) definition of climate change is
‘‘Climate change refers to a change in the state of the
climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests)
by changes in the mean and/or the variability of its prop-
erties, and that persists for an extended period, typically
decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural
internal processes or external forcings such as modulations
of the solar cycles, volcanic eruptions, and persistent
anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmo-
sphere or in land use.’’ Meanwhile, the main international
treaty for addressing climate change is the UNFCCC which
defines climate change as ‘‘a change of climate which is
attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters
the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in
addition to natural climate variability observed over com-
parable time periods’’ (UNFCCC 1992, Article 1, Para-
graph 2, p. 3).
The main difference between the IPCC and UNFCCC
definitions is that the science examines all climate changes
irrespective of the cause of the change, while the interna-
tional policy process considers anthropogenic climate
change only. Both the IPCC and the UNFCCC agree that
the human influence on the climate seems likely to push the
planet into a climate regime that humanity has not before
experienced, although it is not as extreme as the planet has
witnessed in the past long before humanity existed.
Contemporary global climate change is marked by
human influence, through two main mechanisms (IPCC
2014), with climate change mitigation seeking to tackle
these two mechanisms. First is the anthropogenic release of
greenhouse gases such as methane and carbon dioxide that
trap heat and increase the global mean temperature. Second
are anthropogenic changes to the Earth’s surface, which
reduce absorption of the greenhouse gases emitted by
human activities. One prominent land use change is
deforestation, since trees are an excellent source of uptake
for and storage of carbon dioxide.
Contemporary human-induced climate change influ-
ences many hazards, exacerbating some and diminishing
others. Climate change is, in effect, a potential hazard
driver or a potential hazard diminisher, rather than being a
hazard itself. The complexities of the interactions between
climate change and specific hazards in specific locations
sometimes make attribution and projections challenging.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
2012) attempted to analyze links between climate change
and hydrometeorological hazard trends and extremes. Few
strong associations were found, with daily high tempera-
ture being the most prominent. It is conceivable that
IPCC’s (2012) method might not be robust enough to
discover correlations or lack thereof by: (1) highlighting
climate change perspectives and theories without equal
consideration of wider disaster and development topics;
and (2) aiming to analyze connections that would require
centuries of consistent and comparable data from around
the world—data that do not and potentially cannot exist.
Nonetheless, individual studies provide insights into pos-
sible influences of climate change on some hazards or
potential hazards.
For tropical cyclones, it appears as if—particularly for
Atlantic hurricanes—climate change could lead to reduced
frequency of storm formation but increased intensity once a
storm forms (Knutson et al. 2010). There are feedbacks
amongst sea surface temperatures, stratospheric winds, and
the lessening temperature differential between the poles
and the tropics (because the poles are warming faster than
the tropics), in addition to other factors, which make
analysis challenging. It is much clearer that storms in the
Norwegian Sea termed ‘‘polar lows’’ are expected to
decrease in frequency due to climate change because the
North Atlantic’s ocean water is projected to warm more
slowly than the air above it, leading to more atmospheric
stability which discourages polar low formation (Zahn and
von Storch 2010).
Nonetheless, precipitation is expected to become more
intense in many locations around the world due to climate
change. Warmer air can hold more moisture, which means
that quantity and intensity of rain can increase, with one
likely consequence being increased rainfall-induced
flooding overall. Meanwhile, as sea ice around the Arctic
diminishes due to climate change, storms can produce more
wave energy, which exacerbates coastal erosion. Some
communities in Alaska are already experiencing this
problem and are preparing to resettle inland due to it
(Bronen and Chapin III 2013). Sea levels rising due to
climate change—as water warms it becomes less dense, so
its volume expands leading to an increasing sea level—are
impacting some low-lying islands, through worsening
floods, erosion, and water salinization. As a result, com-
munities in Papua New Guinea, for example, are planning
and enacting resettlement (Mercer 2010). Again, interac-
tions are complex and climate change is not certain to
increase floods in all locations. As a specific example,
climate change is expected to decrease winter flood fre-
quency in central Europe’s Elbe and Oder rivers due to
fewer ice jams (Mudelsee et al. 2003).
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Such complexities impact other hazards. Increased pre-
cipitation (and even increased earthquakes, as discussed
below) under climate change could be expected to increase
the frequency and magnitude of landslides, but this outcome
is not straightforward. For a mass movement to occur, there
must be material to slide. An initial increase in the fre-
quency of mass movements due to climate change could
potentially use much of the available slideable material,
leading to smaller movements in the future because less
material can build up before it moves. With avalanches,
increased precipitation could lead to more snowfall accu-
mulation and hence more avalanches, whilst elevated air
temperatures could reduce avalanche magnitude if the
precipitation falls as rain rather than snow. The effects of
climate change on all forms of slides will be highly local-
ized, not only due to local changes in precipitation and air
temperature but also due to local topography, infrastructure,
and human decisions regarding slide risk management.
Costello et al. (2009) summarize the likely impacts of
climate change on microbiological hazards by focusing on
rodent-borne and vector-borne diseases. As temperatures
increase, vectors and parasites tend to breed and mature
more quickly. More life cycles are permitted within a given
timeframe along with an increased rate of biting, each of
which supports the spread of vector-borne diseases. In
addition to these time factors, vector density over a given
area tends to increase as temperature rises. Vectors are able
to survive at higher altitudes and latitudes than before
because the climate in these locations matches conditions
to which the vectors are adapted. Populations living at
higher altitudes and latitudes often have not before had to
deal with these vectors or pathogens, so their immunity and
their knowledge of countermeasures could be limited.
Costello et al. (2009) particularly highlight mosquito-
borne and tick-borne diseases such as malaria, encephalitis,
and dengue fever, but their arguments likely apply to many
other diseases such as lyme disease, leptospirosis, and West
Nile Fever. The authors also indicate some factors
inhibiting vector-borne and rodent-borne diseases due to
climate change. For instance, where hydrometeorological
hazard frequency or intensity increases, or where the
environmental hazards change in nature, vector eggs and
larvae could be harmed. Heavy rains can wash away vec-
tors at many life cycle stages. Salinization of water due to
sea-level rise and coastal inundation could inhibit vectors
that need freshwater or could induce them to move inland
or to higher elevations.
Prospects for geological hazards being influenced by
climate change are discussed by McGuire (2013), who
provides geophysical explanations for how volcanic erup-
tions, tsunamis, and earthquakes have the potential to be
augmented, but there are high levels of uncertainty. Sim-
plistically, as sea levels rise and as glaciers melt, a shifting
of the weight on the Earth’s crust has the possibility for
affecting seismicity and underwater landslides, with sub-
sequent effects on tsunamis. Similar impacts could poten-
tially affect volcanic eruptions. There is much speculation
and many uncertainties regarding the interaction between
climate change and geological hazards. In contrast, since
climate change by definition affects only planet Earth,
there seems little scope for impacts on astronomical haz-
ards. One possibility is that any space weather influencing
the atmosphere could have its impacts altered due to
changing atmospheric composition under climate change.
Climate change is an example of a major environmental
hazard driver and diminisher, indicating the intricacies and
complexities involved in trying to understand the overlaps,
connections, and interactions amongst environmental haz-
ards. Other environmental hazard influencers could also be
affected, examples of which are cycles such as El Nin˜o-
Southern Oscillation, the Indian Ocean Dipole, and the
North Atlantic Oscillation.
Climate change’s projected impacts on disaster risk are
not confined to the hazard side, but also encompass vul-
nerability. Climate change drives vulnerabilities by
changing local environmental conditions so rapidly that
local environmental knowledge cannot keep pace with and
is less applicable to, for example, local food and water
resources along with pest management, especially where
new species enter an ecosystem due to the changing
environment. Whether climate change is a more significant
or a less significant contributor than other factors—such as
relying on structural approaches for floods or increasing the
social oppression that creates and perpetuates vulnerabili-
ties—depends on the specific context. As well, vulnera-
bility’s root causes are social and political conditions
(Hewitt 1983, 1997; Lewis 1999; Wisner et al. 2004,
2012), which can be addressed irrespective of climate
change, whereas hazards usually have an environmental
component, which is not always so straightforward to
influence successfully.
Consequently, climate change’s influence on disaster
risk is much more on the hazard side than on the vulner-
ability side, affecting hazard parameters so that sometimes
the hazard is exacerbated and sometimes the hazard is
diminished. With this understanding of how climate change
influences disaster risk, the next section explores mentions
of climate change in the SFDRR.
3 SFDRR Mentioning Climate Change
SFDRR mentions the phrase ‘‘climate change’’ 15 times in
its 50 paragraphs, compared to the HFA 2005-2015
(UNISDR 2005), which mentioned the phrase 13 times in
34 paragraphs. These basic numbers show that climate
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change is well-represented within the SFDRR and HFA,
but it is not domineering and its relative influence might
have diminished due to lower rate of appearances per
paragraph in the SFDRR compared to the HFA. This sec-
tion clusters, discusses, and analyzes those appearances
according to three main themes: (1) Climate change
affecting disaster risk and disasters; (2) Cross-sectoral
approaches; and (3) Implementation.
3.1 Climate Change Affecting Disaster Risk
and Disasters
Several paragraphs in the SFDRR mention how climate
change affects disasters and disaster risk. Paragraph 4
states ‘‘Disasters, many of which are exacerbated by cli-
mate change and increasing in frequency and intensity,
significantly impede progress towards sustainable devel-
opment’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 4). Meanwhile, Paragraph 42
refers to the Small Island Developing States noting that
‘‘The effects of disasters, some of which have increased in
intensity and have been exacerbated by climate change,
impede their progress towards sustainable development’’
(UNISDR 2015, p. 22) These statements are fair since, as
discussed in Sect. 2, climate change does exacerbate some
hazards, which in turn exacerbates some disasters. The
SFDRR does not include an equivalent statement that many
hazards and hence disasters are diminished by climate
change, indicating an imbalance in how climate change is
portrayed. The choice of the words ‘‘many’’ and ‘‘some’’ in
those respective paragraphs is vague, perhaps deliberately
so, not even indicating whether or not climate change
would be expected to impact the majority, the worst, or
some other descriptor of hazards.
That is particularly surprising since disaster risk reduc-
tion by definition considers all hazards while, as discussed
in Sect. 2 of this article, climate change affects mainly
hydrometeorological hazards with discernible effects on
biological hazards and a currently expected modicum of
influence on geological hazards. The SFDRR could have
made it much clearer that hazards exist which need to be
addressed by disaster risk reduction but which are not
affected, and perhaps cannot be affected, by climate
change.
Meanwhile, climate change is appositely accepted as a
disaster risk driver. Paragraph 6 describes how ‘‘More
dedicated action needs to be focused on tackling underly-
ing disaster risk drivers, such as the consequences of
poverty and inequality, climate change and variability’’
(UNISDR 2015, p. 4) while Paragraph 13 highlights the
importance of ‘‘Addressing climate change as one of the
drivers of disaster risk’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 6). In referring
to only disaster risk, rather than decoupling risk into hazard
and vulnerability, an opportunity is lost to further
emphasize that climate change affects principally the
hazard side of risk while humanity has much more
opportunity to reduce vulnerability, thereby reducing dis-
aster risk irrespective of climate change. Elsewhere in the
SFDRR, the importance of vulnerability is raised and the
message is relatively clear that vulnerability is the funda-
mental driver of disaster risk. Given that this ethos is
accepted and stated, it could have been reiterated with
respect to climate change to continue indicating that
humanity can and should tackle disaster risk no matter
what climate change might bring—which is done by
tackling vulnerability.
Yet this point is not acknowledged in the final mention
connecting climate change with disaster risk: Paragraph
25b states as part of ‘‘Understanding disaster risk’’ that
‘‘global and regional levels’’ should ‘‘Promote the conduct
of comprehensive surveys on multi-hazard disaster risks
and the development of regional disaster risk assessments
and maps, including climate change scenarios’’ (UNISDR
2015, p. 11). This approach is reasonable and is needed as
one component within wider tasks, but it is far from suf-
ficient since these assessments and maps provide only a
small component of what is needed regarding ‘‘compre-
hensive surveys.’’ An important wider task would be to
consider multivulnerability disaster risks in tandem with
multihazard disaster risks. Such a task entails recognizing
the numerous sources from which vulnerability is created
and supported, such as marginalizing certain groups, not
monitoring and enforcing planning and construction regu-
lations, allocating resources away from those who need the
most support for disaster risk reduction, and environmental
degradation through resource over-extraction and biodi-
versity loss (Hewitt 1983, 1997; Lewis 1999; Wisner et al.
2004, 2012). Yet the SFDRR contains multiple mentions of
‘‘multi-hazard’’ without a single mention of ‘‘multi-vul-
nerability’’ and without calling for ‘‘comprehensive sur-
veys’’ for vulnerability, despite the decades of research on
multiple vulnerabilities and the importance of tackling
vulnerability for dealing with disasters (Hewitt 1983, 1997;
Lewis 1999; Wisner et al. 2004, 2012). Similarly, while
climate change scenarios are needed, so are future vul-
nerability scenarios, yet those are not asked for in the
SFDRR.
When it comes to climate change affecting disaster risk
and disasters, the SFDRR usefully incorporates climate
change as one factor, and especially as one risk driver,
amongst many. The inadequate emphasis on disaggregating
risk into hazard and vulnerability in order to recognize
what climate change does and does not influence weakens
the document by potentially leading to the interpretation
that solving climate change will necessarily reduce disaster
risk. That is not the case since climate change does not
exacerbate all hazards and since vulnerability must be
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addressed in order to truly reduce disaster risks, an area
over which climate change has some but limited impact.
3.2 Cross-Sectoral Approaches
Section 1 of this article describes the situation of three
separate global processes in 2015 that set three separate
agendas for development-related topics in coming years.
The SFDRR addresses cross-sectoral interaction between
climate change and disaster risk reduction in many ways,
providing an impressive indication of the importance of not
remaining isolated, but instead connecting with the other
processes. These paragraphs stop short of directly sug-
gesting approaches for integration for specific players to
embrace and implement.
This point on the need for cross-sectoral approaches
without indicating how to integrate them is explicitly made
in Paragraph 11 describing that ‘‘The intergovernmental
negotiations on the post-2015 development agenda, financ-
ing for development, climate change and disaster risk
reduction provide the international community with a unique
opportunity to enhance coherence across policies, institu-
tions, goals, indicators, and measurement systems for
implementation, while respecting their respective man-
dates’’ (UNISDR 2015, pp. 5–6). In other words, connections
and ‘‘coherence’’ are essential, including for climate change,
but specific actions further for integration are not provided.
This point is reiterated by Paragraph 19h as a guiding
principle: ‘‘The development, strengthening and implemen-
tation of relevant policies, plans, practices and mechanisms
need to aim at coherence, as appropriate, across sustainable
development and growth, food security, health and safety,
climate change and variability, environmental management
and disaster risk reduction agendas’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 9).
The acknowledgment of all these topics is well-done, but the
baseline is again to maintain cross-sectoral ‘‘coherence,’’
rather than considering further, specific steps for connecting
topics alongside operational connections. The absence is
poignant of methodologies to achieve improved integration or
even intersectoral approaches seeking overlaps and more
operational connections. Instead, according to the SFDRR,
existing silos are to be maintained.
Paragraph 13 is entirely about respecting climate chan-
ge’s territory through stating that ‘‘Addressing climate
change as one of the drivers of disaster risk, while
respecting the mandate of the UNFCCC [footnote 6], rep-
resents an opportunity to reduce disaster risk in a mean-
ingful and coherent manner throughout the inter-related
intergovernmental processes.’’ Footnote 6 reads ‘‘The cli-
mate change issues mentioned in the present framework
remain within the mandate of the UNFCCC under the
competences of the Parties to the Convention’’ (UNISDR
2015, p. 6). The messages are clear that a boundary has
been drawn around climate change, that UNFCCC has
control over climate change, and that it would not be
appropriate to try to take down that fence nor to consider
changes to existing mandates in order to better integrate
climate change within disaster risk reduction. There is no
doubt that this approach is practical, pragmatic, and has
been deemed essential by the parties involved. The likeli-
hood of those entrenched in the system giving up power
because it makes sense is so low that it would be a non-
starter to even raise the topic. Even though there might be
little sense in maintaining these boundaries, the SFDRR is
being sensible in comforting those focused on climate
change by assuring them that their power will not be
challenged or removed.
This territorialism is reinforced under the section
‘‘Support from international organizations’’ through Para-
graph 48 which moves into implementation by stating ‘‘To
support the implementation of this framework, the fol-
lowing is necessary’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 23). Several
subparagraphs within this paragraph follow, with two
mentioning climate change:
(1) Paragraph 48c ‘‘The United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR), in particular, to
support the implementation, follow-up and review of
this framework through […] supporting the develop-
ment of coherent global and regional follow-up and
indicators and in coordination, as appropriate, with
other relevant mechanisms for sustainable develop-
ment and climate change’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 24).
(2) Paragraph 48e ‘‘Other international organizations
and treaty bodies, including the Conference of the
Parties to the UNFCCC, international financial insti-
tutions at the global and regional levels, and the
International Red Cross and the Red Crescent Move-
ment to support developing countries, at their request,
in the implementation of this framework, in coordi-
nation with other relevant frameworks’’ (UNISDR
2015, p. 24).
Both paragraphs support ‘‘coordination,’’ which is an
important step in cross-sectoral approaches. The mecha-
nism and leadership for such coordination are not clear,
again due to the reality of not wishing to appear to infringe
on the mandate and power of others. The importance in
these two paragraphs is that they recognize climate change
without letting it dominate. Paragraph 48c highlights
‘‘sustainable development and climate change’’ (UNISDR
2015, p. 24) thereby embracing the two other 2015 global
processes and seeking to join together the follow-ups and
indicators from all three. Paragraph 48e includes
UNFCCC, as is necessary, along with several others from
numerous sectors, as is also necessary. While climate
change is the only framework mentioned directly,
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UNFCCC is a key organization and hence deserves to be
identified. By not listing other frameworks, but instead
leaving it generic, the SFDRR is not limiting its actions and
collaborations. Instead, it retains the opportunity to link
with any existing and future frameworks that would be
relevant to disaster risk reduction. This open approach is
suitable for remaining connected with others without
seeming to attempt to infiltrate their territory or to under-
mine their power base.
In tandem, throughout the SFDRR, there are numerous
mentions of and encouragements for integration amongst
sectors—with a strong emphasis on ensuring that disaster
risk reduction is integrated into other sectors. That is a
generous approach from the SFDRR to ensure that disaster
risk reduction is included in wider actions than merely
disaster-related activities, an important step for cross-sec-
toral approaches. More details are provided in Sect. 3.3.
Taken together, all the cross-sectoral mentions of cli-
mate change present pragmatism. It is disappointing that
opportunities are not grasped to place climate change
within the wider contexts where it belongs, but the rea-
soning is political and it helps to maintain the historical
momentum which separated the three global processes.
Realistically, many researchers, policymakers, decision
makers, and practitioners have significant vested interests
in retaining climate change’s separation from other topics.
Those will not be overcome easily and efforts to do so
might be counterproductive, debasing both disaster risk
reduction and climate change work. The SFDRR treads
carefully with regards to cross-sectoralism, sadly
entrenching artificial differences and divisions in the pro-
cess. Unfortunately, taking other options would not likely
be realistic, but the SFDRR nonetheless does well in
offering plenty to other sectors from disaster risk reduction,
as described in the next section.
3.3 Implementation
The SFDRR has strong paragraphs on implementation
mechanisms at different governance levels, with climate
change being mentioned but without the treatment being
overbearing. Three implementation-related paragraphs
mention climate change.
Despite the difficulties mentioned in Sect. 3.2 regarding
the support for continued separation of climate change from
disaster risk reduction, the SFDRR nonetheless offers to
support the placement of disaster risk reduction measures
into other sectors. That helps to ensure that disaster risk
reduction is not overlooked, but cooperates with other
interests. As part of implementation, Paragraph 47d instructs
‘‘Incorporate disaster risk reduction measures into multilat-
eral and bilateral development assistance programmes
within and across all sectors, as appropriate, related to
poverty reduction, sustainable development, natural
resource management, environment, urban development and
adaptation to climate change’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 23). That is
helpful for moving forward by accepting the situation that
many sectors prefer siloization and so support can be prof-
fered for disaster risk reduction within those silos. The
SFDRR is creating opportunities to work with others on their
terms, rather than trying to dictate what might work best
overall, even though that would not be accepted in order to
protect territory. A powerful tool for implementing disaster
risk reduction is represented through striving to integrate, or
‘‘mainstream,’’ disaster risk reduction into other activities,
adopting experience-based recommendations from places
such as southern Africa (Holloway 2003) and from actors
such as NGOs (Twigg and Steiner 2002).
The SFDRR further discusses implementation of disas-
ter risk reduction with respect to governance. Under Pri-
ority 2, ‘‘Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage
disaster risk,’’ Paragraph 28b states ‘‘Foster collaboration
across global and regional mechanisms and institutions for
the implementation and coherence of instruments and tools
relevant to disaster risk reduction, such as for climate
change’’ followed by several other topics. This approach is
encouraging. Climate change is mentioned but as part of a
list alongside ‘‘biodiversity, sustainable development,
poverty eradication, environment, agriculture, health, food
and nutrition and others, as appropriate’’ (UNISDR 2015,
p. 14). Climate change is thus placed as one important issue
amongst many, which assists in ensuring that climate
change neither is forgotten nor dominates. Additionally,
the links amongst all of these concerns are implicit with the
explicit point that they feed into disaster risk and are
needed for disaster risk reduction. The cross-sectoral
aspects discussed in Sect. 3.2 are boosted, with the hope
that those implementing the SFDRR would recognize and
apply the need for a cross-sectoral approach. The ‘‘col-
laboration’’ mentioned in this paragraph is not just for the
mechanisms and institutions, but is also for involving those
who have concerns in the specific sectors listed.
The third mention of climate change in an implementation
context comes under Priority 4 ‘‘Enhancing disaster pre-
paredness for effective response and to ‘Build Back Better’
in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction’’ (UNISDR
2015, p. 17). Paragraph 33a suggests ‘‘Prepare or review and
periodically update disaster preparedness and contingency
policies, plans and programmes with the involvement of the
relevant institutions, considering climate change scenarios
and their impact on disaster risk’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 18). The
same comment is made as in Sect. 3.1 with regards to climate
change scenarios. These scenarios are needed and it is pos-
itive that they are considered explicitly, but other scenarios
are also of concern and should have been mentioned. Most
notable are vulnerability scenarios, since they have the most
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‘‘impact on disaster risk.’’ Other hazard scenarios should also
be considered, rather than merely climate change related
ones. To ensure that ‘‘disaster preparedness and contingency
policies, plans and programmes’’ are up-to-date and effec-
tive, other examples of hazard scenarios that ought to be
considered are astronomical hazards such as space weather
(not mentioned in the SFDRR) and non-climate change
related trends and variabilities in the climate including
decadal and longer cycles (which are nonetheless affected by
climate change). The latter include El Nin˜o-Southern
Oscillation, the Pacific Decadal Oscillation, the North
Atlantic Oscillation, and the Indian Ocean Dipole (also not
mentioned in the SFDRR). These cycles can require pre-
paredness for and sometimes response to precipitation,
drought, King Tides, coral bleaching, and epidemics
afflicting people, livestock, and crops, amongst many other
hazards, irrespective of climate change.
Additionally, the entire cohort of creeping environmental
changes (also termed ‘‘creeping environmental problems’’
and ‘‘creeping environmental phenomena’’) ought to be con-
sidered. Creeping environmental changes refer to incremental
changes in conditions that cumulate to create a major catas-
trophe or crisis, apparent only after a threshold has been
crossed (Glantz 1994a, b). Aside from climate change,
examples are desertification, salinization of freshwater sup-
plies, and degradation of arable land. As with climate change,
most creeping environmental changes have both natural and
human contributors and they can drive both hazards (mainly)
and vulnerabilities (to a lesser extent), which each influence
disaster risk. Some creeping environmental changes are
mentioned in the SFDRR, for instance ‘‘land degradation’’ in
Paragraph 30f (UNISDR 2015, p. 15), while land use features
prominently in several recommendations. An overarching
framework, such as that in Glantz (1994a, b), and connections
amongst creeping changes are missing.
Nevertheless, it is useful to see climate change playing a
role in implementing ‘‘Build Back Better.’’ Notwithstand-
ing concerns about and critiques of the phrase ‘‘Build Back
Better’’ and its inadequate implementation (Kennedy et al.
2008; Khasalamwa 2009), communities need to account for
climate change, whether affected by a disaster or not.
When a disaster has manifested and reconstruction is in
progress, then opportunities should be grasped to factor
climate change into the rebuilding amongst other hazard
drivers and hazard diminishers, which would be part of
‘‘Build Back Better.’’ The key as always is not to ignore
climate change while not permitting climate change to
dominate or dictate. Instead climate change ought to be one
factor amongst many in postdisaster reconstruction. The
SFDRR does that well, based on the three mentions dis-
cussed above, by including climate change within the
implementation, but not making climate change overbear-
ing, and by having only a handful of mentions of ‘‘climate
change’’ in this context. The limitation in the SFDRR’s
approach is in not treating certain other hazard drivers and
hazards similarly.
4 Discussion
The exploration and examination of ‘‘climate change’’
within the SFDRR reveals mixed results. The articulation
of climate change’s contributions to disaster risk and dis-
asters does not give the full picture while few specifics are
given regarding implementation (Zia and Wagner 2015).
Meanwhile, the cross-sectoral mentions are encouraging in
explicitly admitting gaps and separations between disaster
risk reduction, climate change, and sustainable develop-
ment, but then focusing on mainly coherence and coordi-
nation to redress the challenge, although also offering
plenty from disaster risk reduction to integrate into other
sectors. Due to the limitations, the SFDRR leaves two
operational aspects unaddressed.
First, no effort is made to close the gaps or even to
narrow them substantively. Instead, the opposite happens.
The territories are lucidly delineated and the SFDRR states
openly that those territories should remain. As discussed in
Sect. 3, that is a political decision and little option remains
but to follow this continued separation. Otherwise political
problems are liable to result through accusations of trying
overstep one’s mandate and encroach on someone else’s
turf. This protectiveness of mandates is unfortunate by
avoiding the best overall, integrated approaches (Weich-
selgartner and Pigeon 2015).
The second operational aspect which is not fully
addressed is the details regarding how the cross-sectoral
coherence and coordination will be established and main-
tained. Appropriate principles regarding collaboration are
articulated with none missing—a needed starting point.
The ‘‘then what?’’ question is neither asked nor answered.
How would these principles be effected in practice in order
to ensure that collaboration and cross overs actually occur
and are successful? A high-level, country-based, voluntary
framework might not be the appropriate venue for that
query, which is a fair stance. The challenge remains of
which venue(s) would be appropriate and how the question
might be asked and answered in reality.
Aside from the phrase ‘‘climate change,’’ the SFDRR
mentions ‘‘climate’’ in three other places. Paragraph 25c
includes ‘‘Maintain and strengthen in situ and remotely-
sensed earth and climate observations’’ (UNISDR 2015,
p. 11) while Paragraph 28c discusses global and regional
engagement through existing platforms ‘‘including on
development and climate issues, as appropriate, as well as
promote the integration of disaster risk management in
other relevant sectors’’ (UNISDR 2015, p. 14). The third
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mention of ‘‘climate’’ other than ‘‘climate change’’ is
Paragraph 34c, which supports connections with the Global
Framework for Climate Services. All three are important
and sit well within disaster risk reduction, because disaster
risk reduction certainly includes climate observations
(IPCC 2012), ‘‘climate issues’’ (Holloway 2000), and
‘‘climate services’’ (Glantz 2003).
Yet it is unclear why climate is treated as being so
special, since the SFDRR does not treat other hazards or
hazard drivers similarly. There are no mentions of earth-
quakes, volcanoes, tsunamis, or even weather (or variations
of those words), although some hazards such as droughts
and flooding appear. Those hazards, along with ‘‘storm
observations,’’ ‘‘fog issues,’’ and ‘‘landslide services,’’ go
beyond merely the climate dimension, but barely appear in
the SFDRR—although this would be a highly hazard-
centric approach anyway. The point is not to list all hazards
comprehensively nor to treat them with equal amounts of
text; instead, it is to seek a balance amongst hazards while
placing most emphasis on dealing with vulnerabilities—the
multivulnerability or all-vulnerabilities/all-resiliences
approach. Instead, the SFDRR emphasizes climate, par-
ticularly climate change, amongst all hazards and hazard
drivers—which, to a large extent, is done simply because it
reflects high-level global processes even though that it is
not what the science provides or what workers and com-
munities on the ground experience (Tozier de la Poterie
and Baudoin 2015).
While the SFDRR cannot and does not have a role in
critiquing the emplaced system, accepting what is offered
is bureaucratically and politically appropriate, scientifically
unfortunate, and operationally detrimental by supporting
the status quo without comment. The Global Framework
for Climate Services is an example.
The World Meteorological Organization defines ‘‘cli-
mate services’’ as ‘‘the dissemination of climate informa-
tion to the public or a specific user’’ (WMO n.d.). Services
are important and are needed as part of disaster risk
reduction, but it is unclear why climate should be the main
environmental phenomenon with a global framework for
services. Many other hazards affect humanity, especially
the poorest people and communities with the least choices
and resources (Hewitt 1983, 1997; Lewis 1999; Wisner
et al. 2004, 2012). While many parallel structures exist,
there is no specific global framework for earthquake ser-
vices, landslide services, meteorite services, epidemic
services, flood services, wind services, or many other
environmental phenomena. WMO (2013) does propose a
Global Framework for Space Weather Services while
WMO’s World Weather Watch, started in 1963, tends to be
seen as a Global Framework for Weather Services.
This compartmentalization by hazard is the structure of
the international system, which feeds into the climate
change structure, unnecessarily separating it from disaster
risk reduction. The SFDRR has no scope for trying to
overturn this structure or even for pointing out the diffi-
culty and suggesting improvements, so it is no surprise that
the structure is accepted unconditionally. The consequence,
then, is to perpetuate the hazard focus of many existing
systems and accept the separation of climate change from
disaster risk reduction and sustainable development
processes.
The SFDRR nonetheless tries to make the best of
existing structures, notably through separating its recom-
mendations according to governance scale. Each of the four
priorities is subdivided according to ‘‘National and local
levels’’ and ‘‘Global and regional levels.’’ That is cooper-
ative, dealing with governance entities on their own terms
and further ensuring that concerns do not emerge about
overstepping mandates. As with the rest of the issues
raised, that process also serves to reinforce the separation
between climate change and disaster risk reduction, as well
as between climate change and sustainable development. It
cements the gaps at each governance level. Instead of
advising or recommending to each governance level that
climate change be viewed as one hazard driver/diminisher
within disaster risk reduction, the recommendations push
the authorities and institutions towards keeping the topics
separate. That repeats the same advantages of working
within the current system and not being threatening to it,
while repeating the same disadvantages of not being will-
ing to move the system forward and do what is best for
people on the ground, such as by placing climate change
adaptation as one subset within disaster risk reduction
(Kelman and Gaillard 2010; Kelman et al. 2015) and cli-
mate change mitigation as one subset within sustainable
development.
5 Concluding Comments
This article has reviewed ‘‘climate change’’ within the
SFDRR, analyzing how the topic appears and is addressed
within the framework’s text, alongside the potential
implications for dealing with climate change within the
context of disaster risk reduction. While it is understand-
able why the SFDRR is so carefully politic in accepting the
separation of climate change from disaster risk reduction,
the SFDRR is found lacking an appropriate framing of
climate change. The overall focus of the SFDRR’s rec-
ommendations on tackling root causes of disaster risk,
namely vulnerability, is welcome, but that is undermined
by keeping one hazard driver/diminisher (climate change)
divorced from that work due to the separate intergovern-
mental process. While few practical options are available
with which to change the situation, climate change as a
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separate entity is now accepted and engraved for at least
the next 15 years.
Similar challenges emerge for the third global process in
2015, that of the Sustainable Development Goals. While it
is possible that the final accepted version of the goals will
rectify some of the concerns, given the drafts so far it
seems that the Sustainable Development Goals will also
cement for the next 15 years, perhaps longer, since the
asterisk to draft Goal 13 explicitly separates climate change
from wider sustainable development processes. Neither the
Sustainable Development Goals nor the SFDRR even raise
the question of why their agreements continue to be vol-
untary while climate change aims for a legally binding
accord.
As noted at the outset, the world’s sustainable develop-
ment endeavours are left with stark contrasts even though,
together, the trio of processes and agreements from 2015
converges and culminates a generation’s work on sustain-
ability. The fear is that the convergence will end in 2015,
followed by a divergence to parallel routes, albeit with some
bridges. Those bridges will be built by those practitioners
and administrators who continue to try to connect the topics
and processes, recognizing that they all have common goals
and common pathways, with the separation being political
and territorial rather than practical.
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